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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
ALLAN OSiBORN and LINDA SPENCER,

vs.

Plaintiff-Respondents,

INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA;
THE EQUl'DABLE LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIErrY
OF THE UNITED STATElS, DE1FENDANTS, and
DOROTHY HANCOCK, the duly acting and appointed
Guardian of ROBERT ADRIAN GOODIN, JR.• RONALD
DOUGLAS GOODIN, JOSE.PH PATRICK GOODIN
and PATRIC1iA GOODIN, Minors,
vs.

Defendant-Appellant,

Case
No.

12318

THE EQUITABLE LilFE AiSISURANCE SOCIE.TY
OF THE UNITED STATE.S, A Corporation,

Third Party Plaintiff-Cross-Appellant

vs.
ALLAN OSBORN, Guardian of the persons and estate
of LARRY ALLEN SPENCER. and LISA MARIE
SPEINCER, Minors, et al,

Third Party Defendantr

Appeal from Judgment of the Third Judicial District
Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Honorable
James S. Sawaya, Judge.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT.
FINDLEY P. GRIDLEY
427 - 27ith Street
Ogden, Utah

Attomey

PA UL N. OOTRO-MA.NE1S
430 Judge
Building
Salt
Lake City,
Utah

Attomey

for

Plaintiff-Respondents

WtALLACE D. HURD
1001 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake Oity, Utah
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Attomey for Defendant Cross-AppelCilnt

WALTER R. ELLETT
5085 Soutth ·State Street
Murray, Utah

Special Ancillary Administrator of the Estate of Robert A.
Goodin, deceased,
Respondent
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In the Supreme Court
of the State of lJtah

ALLAN OSBORN and LINDA SPENCER,
Plaintif{-Respondents,
vs.
INSURANCE COMP ANY OF NORTH
AMERICA; THE EQUITABLE, LIFE
ASSURANCE SOCIETY OF THE
UNITED STATES, Defendants, and
DOROTHY HANCOCK, the duly acting and
appointed Guardian of ROBERT ADRIAN
GOODIN, JR., RONALD DOUGLAS
GOODIN, JOSEPH PATRICK GOODIN
Case No.
and PATRICIA GOODIN, Minors,
12318
Defendant-Appellant.
vs.
THE EQUITABLE LIFE ASSURANCE
SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES,
A Corporation,
Th-ird Party Plaintiff-Cross-Appellant
vs.
ALLAN OSBORN, Guardian of the persons
and estate of LARRY ALLEN SPENCER
ad LISA MARIE SPENCER: Minors, et at,
Third Party Defendants.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a verdict and judgment of
the Court, sitting without a jury, entered in favor of
the Plaintiff-Respondents and against the DefendantAppellant. Defendant-Appellant seeks an Order of
the Court reversing the judgment and decision of the
trial Court and remanding the matter to said Court
with instructions to enter judgment in favor of the defendant-a pp ell ant.
STATEMENT OF THE MATERIAL FACTS
The following facts are stipulated and uncontroverted.
On the 12th day of July, 1967, near Cloudcraft,
New Mexico, Robert A. Goodin and Imogene Goodin,
husband and wife, were killed in an automobile accident.
There was no evidence developed that they died other
than simultaneously. Each hlad been married previously and had children from their former marriages.
There were no children born as issue of their marriage
to each other.
Each was the named insured in life and accident
insurance policies held at the time of death. Following is a description of the policies held by Robert A.
Goodin:
Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United
States,
Policy Number 9529C-13960, $17,000, and
Poliicy Number 9529CD-13960, $18,500.
Insurance Company of North America (INA) $20,000.
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The
llfe Assurance Society policies
provided as follows regarding beneficiaries:
"One-half of total amount of insurance to the
insu,red's wife, Imogene 0. Goodin. The remaining half in equal shares to the insured's minor
children, Robert Adrian, Jr., Ronald Douglas,
Joseph Patrick, and Patricia Goodin."
"Subject to the right of the insured to change
the beneficiary in accordance with the policy
provis10ns. If more than one beneficiary is
named, the death benefit, unless otherwise provided herein, will be paid in equal shares to the
designated beneficiaries who survive the insured.
If no such beneficiary survives, payment will
be made in accordance with the terms of the
policy."
Included in the terms of the policy was the following:
"Any part of the life insurance to which there
is no beneficiary designated by the employee
or surviving at the death of the Employee will
be payable in a single sum to the first surviving
class of the following classes of successive preference beneficiaries : The Employee's (a) widow
or widower; (b) surviving children; ( c) surviving parents; ( d) surviving brothers and sisters;
( e) executors or admini'Strators."
The Insurance Company of North America (INA)
policy provided the following as regards beneficiaries:
"EMPLOYEiE
NAME: Robert Adrian Goodin
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BENEFICIARY'S NAME: Imogene 0. Goodin
AMOUNT OF INDEMNITY: $20,000
SIGNATURE /s/ Robert Adrian Goodin
DATE
8/24/62"
and the terms of the policy provided as follows :
"If, at the death of the Insured, there is no surviving beneficiary, the accidental lo'ss of life
indemnity shall be payable in one sum to the
surviving class of the following classes of beneficiaries, otherwise to the estate of the Insured:
wife, husband, child or children, father, mother,
brothers or sisters."
At the time of her death, Imogene 0. Goodin held
policies with the Equitable Life Assurance Society
of the United States identical with those of her husband, only in lesser amounts.
At the time of the deaths of Robert A. Goodin and
Imogene 0. Goodin, they were residents of the State of
New Mexico, a community property state.
Following their deaths, the surviving heirs of Imogene 0. Goodin claimed a portion of the life and accident
insurance proceeds payable under the policies held by
Ropert A. Goodin at the time of his death, claiming
such proceeds should descend and di1:1-tribute through
the estate of Imogene 0. Goodin as community property as required by the laws of the State of New Mexico.
That claim was denied and disputed by the surviving
heirs of Robert A. Goodin, who claimed that the total
policy proceeds should be paid to Robert A. Goodin's
children by his prior marriage as required by the in-
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surance policies and in accordance with the laws of the
State of New Mexico.
Following trial of the matter in tlw District Court,
the Court sitting without a jury, entered Judgment
(Tr. 111-115) in favor of the plaintiffs, Allan Osborn,
the guardian of two of the children of Imogene 0.
Goodin's first marriage and Linda Spencer, her other
adult child, and ordered distribution of the policy proceeds accordingly.
POINT I.
TH COURT ERRED IN AWARDING THE PLAINTIFFS AN INTEREST IN A PORTION OF THE INSURANCE POLICY PROCEEDS OJ:i, ROBERT A.
GOODIN, WHICH ERROR RESULTED FROM AN
ERRONEOUS INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE NEW MEXICO STATUTES AND
LAW CONTROLLING AND EFFECTIVE AT THE
TIME OF HIS DEATH.
As the deaths of the insured under the policy, Robert A. Goodin, and the primary beneficiary, Imogene 0.
Goodin, were simultaneous, the policy proceeds must be
distributed as if the insured survived the beneficiary.
See Section 29-1-28, New Mexico Code Annotated, which
provides:
"29-1-28. Insurance Policies - Death of Insured
and beneficiary. Where the insured and the
beneficiary in a policy of life or accident insurance have died and there is no sufficient evidence that they have died otherwise than simutaneously the proceeds of the policy shall be distributed as if the insured had survived the bene-
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ficiary. If, however, the policy is community
property of the insured and his spouse and there
is no alternative beneficiary except the estate
or personal representatives of the insured, the
proceeds shall be distributed as community property under section 4 (29-1-27)."
The Section cited was adopted in 1959 by New
Mexico as a part of the Uniform Simultaneous Death
Act and, as is obvious, was in effect at the time of the
death of Robert A.Goodin and Imogene 0. Goodin in
1967.
The survivorship of the insured being established
by the statutory presumption, what then do the policies
provide regarding distribution of the proceeds 1 The
Equitable policies provided as follows regarding beneficiaries:
"Any part of the life insurance to which there
is no beneficiary designated by the employee or
surviving at the death of the employee will be
payable in a single sum to the first surviving
class of the following classes of successive preference beneficiaries:
The Employee's (a)
widow or widower; (b) surviving children; (c)
surviving parents; ( d) surviving brothers and
sisters; ( e) executors or administrators."
Section 29-1-28 presumes that Imogene 0. Goodin,
the primary beneficiary, predeceased the insured, Robert A. Goodin, and unless the policy provisions described above are to be completely ignored, it follows
that the children of Robert A. Goodin succeed as the
alternate beneficiaries under the policies and are en6

titled to the total policy proceeds.
The INA policy, regarding beneficiaries, provides
as follows:
"If, at the death of the Insured, there is no
surviving beneficiary, the accid8ntal loss of life
indemnity shall be payable in one sum to the
first surviving class of the following classes of
beneficiaries, otherwise to the estate of the insured: wife, husband, child or children, father,
mother, brothers or sisters."

Again, it clearly follows that the children of Robert A.
Goodin succeed as the alternate beneficiaries and are
entitled to receive the total policy proceeds.
Are the policies and/ or the provisions contained
therein regarding alternate beneficiaries or distribution
of the proceeds affected or changed by the language
and application of Section 29-1-28t
answer must
be in the negative. Only in the event the alternate beneficiary named in a policy is the estate or personal representative of the insured does the Section require a
division or distribution of the policy proceeds different from that spelled out or provided for in the policies_
themselves. If the first alternate, or only beneficiary,
named in the policies had been the estate or personal
representative of the insured, the proceeds would distribute pursuant to Section 29-1-27, New Mexico Code
Annotated:
"29-1-27. Community property. Where a husband and wife have died leaving community
property, and there is no sufficient evidence that
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they have died otherwise than simultaneously,
one-half of all the community property shall pass
as if the husband had survived and as if said
one-half were his separate property, and the
other one-half thereof shall pass as if the wife
had survived and as if said other one-half were
her separate property."
Such was not the case, and if the intent of Section 29-1-28
is to be fulfilled, distribution must be made strictly
as provided by the terms of the policies and, therefore,
to the Goodin children as the first surviving alternate
beneficiaries.
The same result would obtain as regards the policies
in which Imogene 0. Goodin was the named insured and
held by her at the time of her death. Her children
from her prior marriages would be entitled to receive
the total proceeds of those policies.
Plaintiff-respondents rely exclusively, it appears,
upon the decision reached in Re Miller et al vs. Greathous·e et al, 44 New Mexico, 214, 100 P2d, 908, in support of their claim to a part of the proceeds of policies
owned by Robert A. Goodin. That decision was cited
extensively in plaintiff's trial Memorandum (Tr. 96106) and orally argued upon trial of the matter. The
material facts of the Miller case were as follows:
Mr. and Mrs. Miller perished in a common disaster
as did their two daughters of the marriage. At the
time of death, Mr. Miller held a life insurance policy
which named his wife as the beneficiary and, additionally, contained a provision that in the event of the
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death of the beneficiary before the insured, the interest
of the beneficiary was to vest in the insured. Following
the deaths, the heirs of both Mr. and Mrs. Miller
made claim to the proceeds of the insured's policy.
Following trial, the District Court ruled that the proceeds were community property and divided the proceeds equally between the heirs. Appeal was taken by
the heirs of Mr. Miller following the decision, their claim
being that the total proceeds of the policy belonged to
the estate of Mr. Miller and should be so distributed.
It is submitted that the Miller deeision is distinguishable from the case now before the Court for the
following reasons:
1. The decision was reached March 15, 1940, some

years before the adoption of Section 29-1-28 New Mexico
Code Annotated and the other provisions of the Uniform
Simultaneous Death Act. At the time of the decision,
there was no New Mexico provision allowing for a presumption of survivorship in the event of simultaneous
deaths. It was, therefore, necessary that the party
claiming the benefit of survivorship prove by good and
sufficient evidence the fact of survivorship. It is clear,
from a reading of the decision that it was reached and
based primarily on the inability to establish survivorship between the husband and wife . Such is evidenced
from the following language appearing in the opinion:
"In the instance case Silas and Opal Miller died
simultaneously. Neither survived the other. No
rights resulting from survivorship arose or can
be claimed. The statute which might have given
the wife's interest to the husband does not oper-
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ate in the case before us for the simple reason
that the contingency of survivorship did not
happen. The result is that the respective vested
interest of each falls into his or her estate and
descends accordingly. There is no other theory
that we can follow which would be consistent
with our theory of holding that insurance payable to the husband's estate, if taken out after
marriage, is community property."
Additionally,
"If she (Mrs. Miller) had predeceased him, the
policy by its very terms, as well as by the provision of 1929, Com. St. Section 38-104, would
have become his separate estate. If she had
survived him the proceeds of the policy would
have gone to her by the terms of the policy.
Neither of these events occurring, a different
result follows."

But for the fact that the policy proceeds were payable
to the estate of the insured in the :Mi11er case, a different result would have obtained had survivorship
in fact been established. The purpose in adopting the
Uniform Simultaneous Death Act was to resolve such
difficulties in future cases involving simultaneous
deaths and to fill the void existing at the time of
the Miller decision.
2. Secondly} the policy of insurance involved in the
Miller case provided for payment of the proceeds, in
the ·event the beneficiary predecease<l the insured, to
the estate of the insured. Such is not the situation in
10

the present case. The policies held by Robert A. Goodin
made provision for payment to alternate beneficiaries
other than his estate or personal representative as
herein earlier discussed.
It is respectfully submitted that the trial courts
apparent rejection of the applicability of Section 29-1-28
in the instant case -was error for the reasons herein
stated. The apparent acceptance of the Miller decision
as controlling and the a-warding of a judgment to the
plaintiff-respondents in pursuance of that opinion -was,
also error for the same reasons.

CONCLUSION
In adopting Section 29-1-28 as part of the Uniform
Simultaneous Death Act in 1959, it is evident that the
N e-w Mexico legislature intended to treat insurance
policy proceeds specially and intended to permit a deceased insured to dictate the distribution of the proceeds
of the policy except -when payable to the estate of the
insured as the only beneficiary. Had the intention been
other-wise, that is to treat the proceeds of all insurance
policies, regardless of beneficiary designation or provision as community property and divide the proceeds
equally, there -would have been no need for Section
29-1-28 as Section 29-1-27 -would suffice in all instances.
In keeping with the intent of the legislature and
in fulfillment of the deceased insured's intention, as
evidenced by the terms of the insurance policies involved,
it is respectfully submitted that the tot.al insurance pol11

icy proceeds payable under the policies held by Robert
A. Goodin at the time of his death should be paid to the
first surviving alternate beneficiaries as provided for in
the policies. That is to his children from his former
marriage.
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